Abstract. While there is a role for more corporate governance, new regulations, and improved codes of best practice to address current weak organisational security practices, this won't necessarily be sufficient in the current dynamic security environment. Organisations will need to acknowledge that their information security has to be able to continually adapt to changing conditions, by extending security governance to middle management as well as system/network administrators. Current security governance is often based on a centralized decision making model and still uses an, in our experience, ineffective and old-fashioned 20th century risk management approach to security. This old-fashioned centralized security approach is relatively simple to manage: It needs almost no security governance at the middle management and business unit level as most decisions on security controls are made at the top enterprise level. As the case study discussed in this paper illustrates, however, the lack of clear security objectives and business security strategies at the business unit level is likely to result in a compliance culture, where those responsible for implementing information security are no longer interested in improving security itself, as long as they comply with the organisation's standards and policies.
Introduction
In the current dynamic information security environment, simply implementing controls and state-of-the-art security is no longer adequate. Many organisations are still basing their information security on the old ISO 17799 security standarddeveloped decades ago -and as a result they are often struggling to cope with the increase in threats and vulnerabilities not addressed by current security standards. The question is whether new security standards introduced over the past decade are likely to change this situation.
While the new 270000 series of standards [1] have introduced a lifecycle model to security management, the emphasis is still on the controls needed in information security. Little information is given about security objectives or on potential strategies to implement these objectives. Neither are there any suggestions, outside a mention of risk analysis, on how organisations should develop security objectives and strategies as part of their security governance process. Although this emphasis on controls in security standards worked well in a reasonable static security environment, in today's ever changing security environment organisations will need to encourage and promote innovation in their approach to security management -going beyond what is prescribed in the current standards [2] .
Corporate security governance has primarily to do with how the board of directors and executive management run and control a company. It addresses mainly security management issues such as "setting the responsibilities and practices exercised by the board and executive management with the goal of providing strategic direction, ensuring that objectives are achieved, ascertaining that risks are managed appropriately and verifying that the enterprise's resources are used responsibly" [3] .
Understanding how certain aspects or characteristics of security governance at the enterprise level and below influence the quality of strategic decision making in information security is an essential step to ensuring that investments in security are not wasted. The ability to make well-informed decisions about the many important components of governing for enterprise security, such as adjusting organisational structure, designating roles and responsibilities, allocating resources (including security investments), managing risks, measuring results, and gauging the adequacy of security audits and reviews is crucial. Our research [4] , [5] indicates that efforts to improve decision making in these areas currently is mostly focused on corporate security governance.
Unfortunately, this current emphasis on corporate governance fails to effectively address the need to ensure that decision making at the lower levels of the enterprise is improved, i.e. the need to establish security governance at the business unit level and below. From this point, we will refer to this level of governance as enterprise-wide security governance, or just security governance, whilst referring to corporate security governance when discussing issues related to board level governance issues.
Hence, while there is some evidence of a reasonable effort to develop corporate security governance guidelines and frameworks, as discussed later in this paper, there is at the moment little known about enterprise-wide security governance. In particular little is known about how organisations develop their security strategic context: How they decide on security objectives and strategies and how they use these to develop their policies and security infrastructures [6] . The current emphasis at the coal face on implementing policies, without any guidance on what objectives these policies aim to achieve or what strategies the organisation aims to implement, means that most organisations are continuing to struggle in their security efforts. Considering this lack of guidance for the key people who have to ensure that the organisation's information assets are adequately secured, it is not surprising that our studies have found they will often be more concerned with compliance than with information security itself.
This papers reports on one of several case studies that the authors have conducted in the area of enterprise-wide security governance. This specific case examines the information security function in a business unit of a large organisation with centralised security management. This is a fairly common situation in large organisations where centralised security management prescribe what security policies and controls will need to be implemented at the coal face. This paper will discuss several of the major issues related to 'enterprise wide security governance' (security governance) that we discovered in our in-depth case studies as well as how these issues effect the information security strategic context for this particular organisation.
Historical Background
Information Security is a constantly evolving discipline. As the environment an organisation operates in changes continuously (dynamic environments), threats are changing too. And, as business needs change and business technologies change, so too must the strategies, tactics and operations you employ to protect the organisation from accidental and non-accidental security attacks.
Organisations today face more sophisticated attacks than in the past, both internal and external. An the pressure on organisations to safeguard themselves adequately is further increasing, as they have much more to lose as well. Defence against such attacks are, one might reasonably observe, the bread and butter of security professionals. And yet, high-profile security breaches continue to happen [7] , [8] . Experts agree one cause is narrow thinking on the part of security executives [9] , [10] , [11] . For example, in mid June (2006), New York based AIG acknowledged the theft of the personal data of almost a million people. Firewalls and intrusion detection technology were not the deficiency -thieves simply broke into a regional office and physically carried off a server, along with a laptop.
Previous studies [3] , [12] indicate that organisations are now beginning to realize the importance of having to prepare for these increased security risks in an appropriate and effective manner. An interesting discovery from these studies were that even with this renewed emphasis on strategic security planning, the majority of organisations nevertheless are continuing to simply do "what everyone else is doing" [13] , [14] . We believe that simply doing "what everyone else is doing" is indicative of a severe problem with an organisation's strategic security planning.
Corporate Governance
Historically, the end game of corporate governance has been sustained financial results [15] . This has been predominantly achieved by means of a focus on financial management, so much so that in the recent past, corporate governance was virtually synonymous with the measuring, monitoring and reporting of the financial condition of the enterprise [16] . While focus on sustained financial results is an appropriate and timeless end, the landscape upon which business is conducted has changed such that the means to achieving that aim must change in a number of important ways.
Traditionally, corporate governance was the responsibility of the board and its immediate delegates (top management and financial auditors), and the focus was financial. In today's complex organisations, where the corporation's "value constellation" is made up of a constantly changing set of entities (some outside the organisation's direct control), governance activities must be extended both down into and outside of the organisation to include an expanded role for internal staff at all levels and external entities [15] , [17] . IT and security auditors must also be added to the pool of interested parties.
Literature on Security Governance advocate the idea of incorporating Security Governance as a subset of Corporate Governance. An example is laid out by the Corporate Governance Task Force in their 2004 report entitled "Information Security Governance -A Call To Action": "…the private sector should incorporate information security into its corporate governance efforts." [18] .
And again from a statement by eSecure: "(IT) Security is part of the business and it is imperative to assign responsibility for managing information security to the Board level as information is a valuable and critical corporate asset." [19] .
The report further argues that if organisations are serious in their efforts to secure their information assets, then "executives must make information security an integral part of core business operations." The report suggests the best way to accomplish this goal is none other than to highlight it as part of the existing internal controls and policies that constitute Corporate Governance. Furthermore, the report provides a number of recommendations and even what they have termed, an "Information Security Governance Framework," to assist organisations in incorporating Information Security (InfoSec) into their Corporate Governance processes.
From these discussions, two possibilities are revealed. Firstly, not enough is being done to protect organisations. There has been much literature written and much research done on implementing Information Security Policies (ISPs), on cultivating a security culture within organisations, on putting in place technical deterrents and counter measures such as firewalls, proxy servers, password protection and so on. However, these approaches still appear to be insufficient in protecting organisations. Secondly, organisations may have reached a stalemate when considering security and they are simply doing "what everyone else is doing." Organisations are thus baffled, and faced with the question "what can we now do to protect ourselves?
Enterprise-wide Security Governance
A strategic approach to InfoSec aims to transform the IT security function from a set of ad hoc activities with an emphasis on technology to a coordinated approach of principles, behaviours, and adaptive solutions that map to business requirements [20] . The field of InfoSec is a complex and critical component to an organisation's success. As such, those responsible for security are not just senior management but also middle management and others involved with the implementation of security strategies (those at the coalface), and they will need a governance framework for making informed decisions about Information Security. As the practices and methodologies behind Corporate Governance and IT Governance are somewhat reliable and time tested and seen to be successful in dealing with various organisational issues, it is plausible to suggest that improving Security Governance throughout the enterprise may be the key to improving the level of security in organisations.
Frameworks
This study of security governance focuses on enterprise-wide governance to improve decision making at the 'coal face'. It is concerned with the people that implement security and about how they go about making decisions with or without guidance from the organisation.
In order for decision makers to make quality decisions, appropriate guidance must be effectively communicated to them in the form of the organisation's security strategic context [6] , that is through mission statements, objectives, strategies, tactics and so on.
Trying to quantify what a good security strategic context is and how can one improve it is a complex problem that cannot be adequately answered in a single study. Importantly, however, Peterson et. al. [21] , [22] , argued that good security strategic context "requires active participation and a shared understanding among stakeholders if they are to coordinate activities and adapt to changing circumstances" Developing security strategic context exclusively at the top management level is likely to result in a lack of diversity across the security strategic context. Good security strategic context needs to be developed by different people/committees at different levels of the organisation, similar to the development of IT strategic context [23] , [24] .
To ensure a comprehensive study of security governance, the authors first developed and tested a security governance research "framework" that identifies five major aspects of security governance, namely, decision making rights, input rights, experience and culture, accountability, and strategic context [12] . Exploring each of these aspects of governance in depth is, off course, an enormous task and, accordingly, a decision was made to focus our research particularly on one aspect of security governance, that is, on security strategic context. Strategic context was identified as a key component of successful IT governance [25] , and similarly a decision maker at the coal face is not likely to make good decisions about security without a decent knowledge of the organisation's security strategic context either.
To guide our research on how organisations develop their security strategic context we borrowed a strategic context model from IT governance [26] [27], and expanded that model into a two-dimensional 'Scope of security strategic context' framework that covers both depth and coverage of the security strategic context.
Dimension 1 -Depth of Security Strategic Context
This dimension strives to clarify how extensive the organisation's strategic context covers strategic, tactical and operational aspects by adapting the 5 domains from Broadbent and Weill's [26] original IT strategic context model.
• Security Objectives (mission statements) -These security objectives are high-level statements that inform the organisation about how security will be used to create business value and to protect it. Security objectives clarify focus and furthermore, they provide a frame of reference for every important aspect of security activity, from incident handling to disaster recovery and asset/information protection to user functionality.
• Security infrastructure -The strategies employed to build shared and standardised security services/beliefs/ideals across the organisation (Strategic Security Policies, etc) and the operationalisation (implementation) of those strategies.
• Security architecture -The set of choices that guide the organisation in satisfying security needs (decision/input rights) • Security application needs -Applications that need to be acquired or built.
For example, VPN's, firewalls, etc.
• Security investment and prioritisation -Regulates the process of security investment, that is, where it should be focused, the procedures for progressing initiatives, their justification, approval and accountability.
Dimension 2 -Coverage of Security Strategic Context
This dimension was added to the original one-dimensional IT model as organisational security is critically dependant on the coverage of an organisation's security endeavours. Hence, this dimension covers, how 'broadly defined' the organisation's security strategic context is with regard to the different aspects of security.
In constructing this second dimension, an extensive examination of the general literature on Information Security (InfoSec) was performed [5] . This included a review of international standards and guidelines such as the OECD, COSO, ITIL, ISO and COBIT. The resulting security areas currently included in our framework are:
• Network Security -This refers to the controls/actions that secure the corporate network, prevent unauthorised access to systems and data, and ensure data integrity and availability over the network.
• Systems and Data Security -Is about the protection of the information (availability, integrity, confidentiality, authenticity and validity) and handling of information. Includes user account management, monitoring and revocation processes, etc.
• Physical Security -This concerns the protection against human intrusions and natural disasters such as fire, water leakage and other environmental failures.
• Personnel Security -Includes such aspects as hiring policies, termination practices and access controls.
• Operations Security -Is concerned with business continuity, ensuring the integrity and availability of crucial data after a disaster or other disruptions. For example, protecting stored financial reporting data so that business transactions that continue during downtime are properly accounted for.
• Miscellaneous Security aspects. -This acknowledges that there most likely will be other areas that organisations will focus their security on that doesn't fall within the 5 aspects of security above. For example, a focus on eCrime, incident handling, and so on.
The case study
The case study reported in this paper took place in an Asian subsidiary of a large international corporation I.T US Inc. For this paper we will call this subsidiary ITUM.
I.T US Inc. is a world player in Information Technology (I.T). Worldwide, I.T US Inc. (ITU) operates in over 150 countries. Its subsidiary ITUM has two fundamental missions:-1) To lead in the creation, development and manufacture of the IT industry's most advanced information technologies.
2) To translate these advanced technologies into value for their customers through their professional solutions, services and consulting businesses worldwide.
Having solutions that support various industries such as banking, securities and finance and telecommunications and being one of few IT companies that can provide end to end solutions to customers, ITUM is highly flexible and an extremely innovative organisation with a high emphasis on teamwork, diversity, performance and of course, like any business, profits.
Being part of a large multinational organisation, ITUM's 'security' benefits from high availability of resources and separate funding. As is not unusual in large international organisations, ITU maintains a separate and independent corporate security department. This corporate security department, having been delegated the responsibility of security for the entire ITU organisation, is staffed by "security specialists". Their job is to maintain, develop and distribute security policies, procedures, standards and guidelines to the entire ITU organisation.
The main participants from ITUM who were involved in the study were Mr. A the IT Manager, Mr. B the Security Manager and Ms. C the IT Specialist. From a security perspective, all three participants agree that security is a key component in the operations of ITUM. Overall, Mr. A is responsible for ensuring that the organisation's IT functions smoothly. For ITUM to be competitive, efficient and responsive, it carries out many of its business functions using IT and this adds additional responsibilities and pressures on Mr. A to ensure that the day to day running of the organisation's systems, networks and so on, are available (up-time of the server), consistent and reliable (integrity). As Mr. A describes his responsibilities, we can start to understand the kind of pressures that he would be put under and the specific areas to which he would put more emphasis, such as availability.
"…you know how critical information is to us…we have that network connection and it is crucial that it works."
Their operational perspectives reflect an emphasis on compliance through ensuring that corporate guidelines are followed and that compliance to formal security standards (mandated from the corporate security department) and corporate standards are met, Mr. A feels that the organisation, with its corporate standards and guidelines, is pretty secure with regards to security. He doesn't have to worry too much about it. Instead, all he is concerned about is ensuring that his systems, his networks and his infrastructures meet the required standards set down by Corporate.
Mr. B, the Security Manager has a number of portfolios for which he is responsible. These folios include site security (organisation's internal and external security), Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) and Program Security. Mr. B's position makes him responsible for implementing security strategies and tactics within ITUM which includes, "…counselling the management, to help them, to advice them with respect to the company's security policies," which really are about security awareness and security education.
As Mr. B describes it, his security/awareness programs are to make sure that the security risk for ITUM is manageable and "…to avoid any untoward situations." "I do presentations or at times I will send a memo across the organisation about security, about things that happen, about security tips, prevention…" It is clear that Mr. B too has a high reliance and confidence in ITUM's corporate security standards and guidelines. Mr. B's main role is to implement security policies funnelled down to him from the corporate security department -a bias for compliance.
Unfortunately, because of this governance structure, Mr. B has limited involvement in the development of high level security strategies and policies. Hence his understanding of the security strategic context to which it relates, is limited. In fact, his exact involvement in security strategies and policies is confined to him checking the validity of corporate security policies for the local circumstances and ensuring that ITUM is compliant to the standards set by Corporate.
For Ms. C her role is an IT Specialist in the area of IT operations. Bearing a number of responsibilities and being from an IT background, Ms. C is involved in project management, asset management and process architecture. Under asset management, Ms. C acts as ITUM's country controller whereby she liaises with project executives on asset management related matters. On the process side, according to her, Ms. C plans, develops and implements IT security processes in ITUM. Like her colleagues Mr. A and Mr. B, she believes that ITUM's security is pretty good.
Although not directly involved with the corporate security group, as a process architect, occasionally Ms. C will "design IT security processes," and according to her, that's where she picked up her awareness about security. Like Mr. B, in reference to ITUM's corporate security standards and guidelines, Ms. C comments that she must design the security processes and policies following those corporate standards/guidelines.
Like the other participants, because of the governance structure at ITUM that simply communicates only the policies, the consequences are that Ms. C's ability to understand and comprehend the security strategic context is limited. Her focus is primarily and strictly on adhering to the specified corporate standards, guidelines and policies (i.e. compliance). When asked about her thoughts on abiding by standards and audits, Ms. C responded: -
"We cannot afford to fail in any audit. Passing the audit is mandatory for us. Compliance is a very, very high focus for us…all I know is we do adhere to standards"

Case analysis and discussion
As stated before this paper will only discuss one of several cases, but to be able to discuss this particular case a more general discussion of our findings across all participating organisations is needed. Using the frameworks discussed earlier as a guide for this study, and as a lens in its analysis, an empirical study was conducted to investigate Enterprise-wide Security Governance in both large and medium sized organisations. The design of this study involved multiple sources of evidence, collected in a structured manner.
With the Security Governance and Security Strategic Context research frameworks verified for its comprehensiveness in previous studies [4] , our current case studies concentrated on Security Governance at the coal face and with the assistance of the participating organisations a number of interesting lessons were learnt. Briefly, they are that: -1. Diversity of decision making is often lacking. Decision makers were found to be making decisions on their own without inputs from others within or from other business units. Likewise, even with inputs from others, for some decision makers, because their governance structure did not encourage it, they never took on the advice given by others. 2. Corporate (Executive) Level mission statements are vague and provide little guidance for those responsible for security at the enterprise level.
Particularly evident in the organisation discussed in this paper where the corporate level guidance encouraged not an understanding of objectives or strategies but unconditional 'replication' of standards -leading to a culture of compliance and limited depth and understanding of the organisations security strategic context. On the flip side, in one of the other organisations, this lack of corporate level mission statements led to good depth in security but only for a number of areas of security that those responsible for security were familiar with and had experience in. This 'silo effect' resulted in the organisation's security being narrow and lacking coverage. 3. Security Governance and IT Governance although closely related, are separate entities. Security Governance is found to be an add-on to the business and follows an IT Governance approach, that is, a bottom up approach to security. Instead, it should be a driver.
These three themes will now be discussed in detail for ITUM. While attention was placed on discussing the points independently, this cannot always be achieved as most points relate to each other. Hence, some points may overlap.
Limited Diversity in Decision Making
The analysis of the security governance and security strategic context of the case studies identified that limited diversity in decision-making is common. At ITUM, almost all decisions about the security strategic context have been decided upon by the corporate security department at the executive levels of the organisation.
"We have globally this dedicated security team who just focuses on doing policies and standards."
(Ms. C, IT Specialist)
As expected, the decisions of corporate security are passed down to the enterprise level via policies, procedures and standards, not objectives or strategies. As Mr. B, the Security Manager describes, "throughout the whole ITUM organisation, in every country, we follow the same template, the same procedures, the same policies."
This idea of security being a 'template' (i.e. a specific implementation of security) that is applied to any and all situations with only slight modifications if the template doesn't fit is likely to create a situation whereby those involved in security perceive security as an A-Z checklist of things that need to be done. As was noticeable during the analysis, very little thought, innovativeness or ingenuity goes into security at ITUM at the enterprise level. Decision-making regarding security that are made at this level are low-level simplistic decisions that revolve predominantly around compliance, controls and passing audits. Although the strategic decisions about security are made at high levels with very little to no communication with other functional levels of the organisation, it was hoped that these decisions are made with inputs from various people from affected units of the organisation (i.e. feedback from various functional areas). Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case at ITUM, with all strategic decisions being made by the "dedicated security team…they're very specialised" (Ms. C, IT Specialist).
"I get guidelines. I get standards. It's all been prepared by HQ. We get statements from the business to tell us what we should and should not do."
(Mr. A, IT Manager)
At ITUM this situation has lead to isolation of the decision makers and therefore reflects a lack of diversity in their decisions.
Corporate Level Security Mission Statements Provide Little Guidance.
When attempting to map ITUM's security activities using the Scope of Security Strategic Context research framework, it becomes clear that a good coverage of security exists at ITUM (e.g. all areas identified by the ISO Standard are covered). Unfortunately, we found a limited depth in security strategic context in each of these areas. This limited depth results in a limited understanding of the objectives that these strategies are trying to achieve. Hence, at least for the participants in this case study, there was a limited understanding of ITUM's Security Strategic Context.
Exploring deeper, we see that most security related activities at ITUM are performed at the 'Security Architecture' and 'Security Application(s) Needed' level with only a few activities being performed at the 'Security Strategies & Infrastructure' level. For instance, at the 'Security Architecture' level, authentication and control of user access, identification and verification of users, monitoring of access control are all performed; security perimeters are defined; user responsibilities are clearly outlined; segregation of duties and routine backup checks are performed; audits and so on. Also, at the 'Security Application(s) Needed' level, clearly a diverse range of hardware, software and policies exists such as firewalls, proxy servers, monitoring software, anti-virus software, surveillance technology, acceptable use policies, document retention policies, education and training, and so on.
Once again, these results are indicative of extremely good coverage of security across the board but limited depth particularly in the areas of 'Network Security', 'Systems Security' and 'Physical & Environmental Security'.
It is also noticeable that while some 'Security Objectives' are obvious or known to participants many others are not. The objectives listed by participants such as "Protection from virus attacks" and "protect assets & protect information in those assets" are of such simplicity and generality in nature that you have to question the quality of those objectives and its ability to function as high-level statements that inform the organisation about how security will be used to create business value and to protect it.
Furthermore, it is not clear whether those objectives mentioned by the participants were communicated to them by higher management or just reflect what they believe they are doing. Security Objectives are meant to clarify focus and provide a frame of reference for every important aspect of security activity. It is not clear whether this has been done. Sadly, many organisations still see Security Governance as just a small part of Corporate Governance. While IT Governance has become a recognised focus area in larger organisations, these organisations often won't give Security Governance the same level of attention. Hence, organisations still need to realise that just like IT, the field of Information Security is a complex and critical component to their organisation's success. As such, those responsible for security are not just senior management but also middle management and others involved with the implementation of security strategies (those at the enterprise level), and they will similarly need a governance framework for making informed decisions about Information Security.
A common theme in all our case studies in enterprise level security governance is a distinct lack of strategic directions in information security. At ITUM, apart from the strategy of implementing the standards and requiring business units to 'pass' audits, security, is an add-on and not a driver in any sense at all. As Mr. A the IT Manager describes, "If I'm putting in any new IT infrastructure I just have to make sure the IT security piece of it is adhered to…"
As in most large organisations, ITUM did have dozens of security applications installed --ranging from firewalls to routers to intrusion detection appliances and other security management services --that track millions of events. There even is software to monitor systems, correlate events, prioritise severity, alert IT staff or take a prescribed action to remedy a problem.
However, as ITUM did not receive any information on the organisation's security strategies it used a bottom up approach to develop it's own objectives and strategies based on compliance.
A bottom up approach for the development of business strategies is common in IT governance. The need within the organisation for particular applications and the need for IT architectures to support these applications will lead to the development of objectives and businesses strategies at executive levels to support these lower levels of the IT strategic context. The question arises if a similar bottom approach is really the way to develop a strategic context in security governance. Unfortunately, research on possible top down approaches to develop a security strategic context is still scarce, but an attempt to develop a strategic context from the top down is described in a recent paper on Ubiquitous security [2] .
Conclusions
In this paper, a clear distinction is made between corporate security governance and enterprise-wide security governance. Corporate security governance can be seen as governance at an executive or board level with its main responsibility being to ensure that appropriate security governance is encouraged, promoted and controlled at the enterprise level and below.
Unfortunately, most current information and academic papers on security governance at the enterprise level promote a centralised decision making model based on, in our experience, an ineffective and old-fashioned 20th century risk management approach to security. The old-fashioned centralised security approach is relatively simple to manage: It needs almost no security governance at the enterprise and business unit level as most decisions are made at the enterprise level. The main disadvantage of this centralised model, however, is the likely creation of a compliance culture in organisational information security.
In the current dynamic security environment, however, this centralised approach does have another major drawback. Centralised decision making will reduce the flexibility and adaptability of an organisation's security posture, making it difficult for the organisation to respond quickly and timely to changes in its security environment.
To create a dynamic and flexible (or agile) security posture, a more decentralised approach to security decision making is needed. A decentralised approach will, however, need good security governance at all levels of the organisation. The problem however is that little guidance on implementing this decentralised approach can be found in literature.
The case study discussed in this paper has revealed a number of interesting and valuable lessons about security governance at the coal face. In our experience these findings can be generalised to many other large organisations that have a centralised security function.
Firstly, the lack of input from people at the enterprise level or coal-face in the current predominantly centralised security planning ethos has stifled innovation in information security. While IT infrastructures in organisations have changed dramatically, the security approach found in the organisations that participated in these and other case studies by the authors were not that much different to the approaches promoted in last century's security standards.
More importantly, with this centralised security enterprise philosophy, the same employees or committee(s) that decide on security infrastructure and applications also decide on (business) objectives and security strategies. Hence the rationale is that there is no need to communicate those objectives and strategies to the rest of the organisation. While not intentional, of course, the organisation's security culture now has evolved toward a compliance culture where compliance to corporate guidelines has become more important than improving security.
For organisations, big or small, multinational or national, that would like to support a flexible decentralised decision making model, it is important that the necessary enterprise-wide security governance structures and processes are developed and put in place. This ensures that adequate security objectives and security strategies are developed and effectively communicated to those employees and committees that are involved with decisions on security infrastructure and security application selection. This, in itself, is expected to promote innovation. Unfortunately current research on security objectives and strategies is still scarce and will need to increase dramatically to facilitate this change in security governance.
